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Notes
THE PROBLEM OF USING HEARSAY IN




On the morning of September 6, 1993, the Honolulu Police De-
partment received a report of a screaming female at a condominium
complex. Upon his arrival at the scene, the responding officer ob-
served a woman, Diana, bleeding from her chest. Diana told the re-
sponding officer, and then the emergency room physician, that her
husband had stabbed her. Later that day, a police investigator con-
ducted a tape-recorded interview with Diana at the hospital. Diana
told the investigator that after a long argument her husband had
jumped on her and, when she screamed, had put his hand on her
throat. After punching her in the back, she said, he threw her in the
closet and stabbed her with a kitchen knife. At her husband’s trial for
attempted second-degree murder, however, Diana’s testimony was
dramatically different—she claimed that the story she had given to
the police was a lie and that she had grabbed the knife and stabbed
herself.1
Diana’s testimony presented the prosecutors with a serious
problem. The only witness to the incident, Diana, was not willing to
testify against her husband. The statements she had made to the po-
lice and medical personnel on the day of the incident were the prose-
cutor’s only potential evidence, but they were classic hearsay.2 The
1. See State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 196-98 (Haw. 1996).
2. “Hearsay,” under Hawaiian law, is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted.” HAW. R. EVID. 801(3). Hearsay is generally not admissible at trial except as otherwise
provided. See id. 802. This definition of hearsay and the rule against hearsay in the Federal
Rules are substantively identical. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c), 802; see also 2 MCCORMICK ON
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prosecutors were fortunate, however, because the court admitted the
statements under several exceptions to the hearsay rule. The court
determined that the statements to the responding officer and emer-
gency room physician could be classified as excited utterances3 and
thus excepted from the hearsay rule.4 Additionally, the court, apply-
ing Hawaii’s prior inconsistent statement exception,5 held that the
tape-recorded statement to the police investigator was admissible
hearsay.6 On the strength of this evidence, Diana’s husband was con-
victed of attempted second-degree murder, and the Hawaii Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction.7
Not every domestic violence prosecutor is as fortunate as those
in the case described above. A victim’s hearsay statements may not
fall easily into a hearsay exception or exclusion,8 and they may there-
fore not be available at trial. This Note examines the particular im-
portance to prosecutors of a victim’s hearsay statements in domestic
violence cases, analyzes the methods by which these statements may
be admitted into evidence, and argues that the adoption of a new
hearsay exception for domestic violence is the most appropriate solu-
tion to the prosecutor’s problem. Part I examines the situations in
which prosecutors may need to use hearsay statements of the victim
and the types of hearsay statements typically at issue. Part II focuses
EVIDENCE § 246, at 96 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (noting that the Federal Rules’ defini-
tion of hearsay is followed by most states).
3. An “excited utterance,” under Hawaiian law, is a “statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition.” HAW. R. EVID. 803(b)(2). The Federal Rule is identical. See FED. R. EVID.
803(2); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 272, at 204-11 (discussing excited
utterances generally).
4. See Clark, 926 P.2d at 202-03.
5. Under the Hawaii Rules of Evidence, a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if
(1) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the statement
and the statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, (2) the statement is offered in
compliance with the rule governing the introduction of extrinsic evidence of prior statements, or
(3) the statement was recorded in a substantially verbatim fashion by electrical means contem-
poraneously with the making of the statement. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1). The Hawaii rule is
broader than the Federal Rule, which allows prior inconsistent statements if the statement was
“given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in
a deposition.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A). See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of the distinc-
tions between Hawaii’s rule and the Federal Rule.
6. See Clark, 926 P.2d at 199-200.
7. See id. at 196.
8. A statement falling under a hearsay exception is excepted from the hearsay rule and is
admissible because it possesses otherwise sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. See, e.g., FED.
R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. A statement falling under a hearsay exclusion may lit-
erally fall within the definition of hearsay, but be explicitly excluded from the definition and
therefore not considered hearsay. See, e.g., id. 801 advisory committee’s note.
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specifically on how some jurisdictions are expanding existing hearsay
exceptions in order to “solve” the problem, and it looks at decisions
that appear to ignore the policy behind the hearsay rule. Part III ad-
dresses the possibility of a legislative solution through the creation of
a statutory exception to the hearsay rule for domestic violence situa-
tions. It discusses the arguments for, and the barriers against, creating
such an exception and critically examines a recently enacted hearsay
exception for threats or infliction of injury.9 Finally, Part IV concludes
that a new hearsay exception for domestic violence would be appro-
priate, and it discusses the elements such an exception would require.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE HEARSAY PROBLEM
Historically, the legal community, as well as society as a whole,
has turned a blind eye to domestic violence,10 largely due to a reluc-
tance to intrude into private matters such as family relations.11 Al-
though both the legal community and society generally have come a
long way in recognizing the problem of domestic violence,12 the scope
of the continuing problem is daunting. In the United States from
1987-1991, there were on average more than 600,000 victims of do-
mestic violence each year; females constituted more than 90% of the
victims.13 During this four-year span, women who were the victims of
9. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1999).
10. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson
and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1466, 1516-17 (1996) (discussing how and why abuse of
women has been ignored and proposing a domestic homicide exception to the evidentiary rule
excluding hearsay “to correct gender biases that have blinded us for too long”); Melanie Frager
Griffith, Note, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141,
150 (1995) (“Throughout history, society has tolerated – even legally sanctioned – abuse against
women.”). For the purposes of this Note, domestic violence can be defined as “the use of physi-
cal or psychological force by one adult against another adult with whom there currently exists,
or has existed, an intimate relationship.” Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The
Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1042 n.5
(1991).
11. See State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868) (“We will not inflict upon society the
greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling vio-
lence.”); Raeder, supra note 10, at 1466 (arguing that the societal desire to keep domestic vio-
lence “hidden from public view” stems from the pervasive problem of gender bias); James Mar-
tin Truss, Comment, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of Protection for
Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1150 (1995) (recognizing judges’
reluctance to intrude into these “family matters”).
12. See Raeder, supra note 10, at 1466 (noting some progress in addressing this serious
problem); Griffith, supra note 10, at 156-60 (recognizing the increased awareness and concern
about domestic violence as a problem, but noting the continuing existence of a problem).
13. See RONET BACHMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT 6 (1994).
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domestic violence were also twice as likely to receive an injury and to
require medical care than women who were victimized by strangers.14
Additionally, 20% of women victimized by their current or former
spouses reported that they had been victims of a series of three or
more similar assaults within the previous six months.15 Approximately
two thousand women are killed by their batterers each year.16
Domestic violence is no longer perceived to be solely a private
matter; it is also a societal problem.17 Domestic violence impacts not
only the abuser and the abused, but children, the extended family, co-
workers, and others.18 Yet, despite the social impact of domestic vio-
lence, the violence usually takes place in private, where only the
abuser and the abused are present.19 This presents a significant prob-
lem for prosecutors. Constitutional prohibitions preclude the prosecu-
tor from compelling the accused to testify against himself.20 Thus, the
testimony of the victim becomes an essential element of the prosecu-
tion’s case. The victim, however, is often unavailable because she has
been killed,21 is unwilling to testify,22 or is otherwise unavailable.23 In
these situations, a victim’s hearsay statements can become the only
opportunity for the prosecutor to bring in the victim’s “voice” at
trial.24
14. See id. at 8.
15. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BETWEEN
INTIMATES 2 (1994).
16. See Raeder, supra note 10, at 1469 (citing various statistics of deaths from domestic
violence).
17. See Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressiveness for Prosecution, 7
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 174 (1997) (emphasizing the broad societal, not just individual, im-
pact of domestic violence).
18. See id.
19. Assaults may frequently be witnessed by children, see id. at 175, but children may often
be incapable of serving as testifying witnesses at a trial, for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., IND.
CODE. ANN. § 35-37-4-6(d)(2)(B) (Michie 1998) (defining categories in which a child may be
found to be unavailable as a witness).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 950 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1997); Browne v. State, 933 P.2d 187 (Nev.
1997).
22. See, e.g., State v. MacArthur, 644 A.2d 68 (N.H. 1994) (involving a victim who recanted
prior statements implicating the defendant); State v. Marcy, 680 A.2d 76 (Vt. 1996) (featuring a
victim who testified at trial that she could not remember what happened).
23. See, e.g., Jay v. State, 503 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (illustrating the difficulties
presented by a victim’s disappearing three weeks before the trial).
24. If the victim chooses to recant an earlier story, her voice is obviously heard at the trial.
In these situations, it is the earlier statements of the victim, contradicting her testimony, which
the prosecutor seeks to introduce.
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A. Situations in Which the Domestic Violence Victim Has Died
When a victim of domestic violence has died, the need to use her
hearsay statements is clearest. Any relevant statements made by the
victim and introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted are
hearsay.25 A prosecutor, however, may still use the statements if they
fall within an established exception to the hearsay rule. Such excep-
tions to the rule are considered to possess sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness other than those provided by direct testimony.26 For
example, a statement made by a victim and heard by a third party,
while still under the stress resulting from an assault, may be admissi-
ble under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.27 This
exception has been used to introduce a victim’s statements regarding
past abuse,28 as well as responses made by the victim prior to death.29
Similarly, the present sense impression exception, which excepts from
the hearsay rule statements describing or explaining an event or con-
dition made while the victim was perceiving the event or condition,30
25. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The prosecutor will also be faced with a Confrontation
Clause problem. The Constitution requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see
also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 252, at 121-26 (discussing the problems of
confrontation and due process). Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, the
right to confrontation is nearly indistinguishable from the hearsay rule. See Patricia W. Bennett,
After White v. Illinois: Fundamental Guarantees to a Hollow Right to Confront Witnesses, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 159, 188-89 (1993) (arguing that the Court “eviscerate[d]” the Confrontation
Clause in its decision in White v. Illinois by allowing the state to secure a conviction with evi-
dence from an available declarant who never appeared at the trial and was never cross-
examined).
26. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note; 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 2, § 253, at 126-27.
27. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 272, at 204-11.
28. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snell, 705 N.E.2d 236, 244 (Mass. 1999) (allowing the
neighbor of the deceased victim to testify as to the victim’s plea for help and her expressed fear
that her husband was trying to “choke her and smother her with a pillow”); State v. Murillo, 509
S.E.2d 752, 759-62 (N.C. 1998) (ruling that conversations about past abuse held between the de-
ceased victim and various family members and friends were admissible as excited utterances
because the victim had described the beatings immediately after they had occurred).
29. See, e.g., State v. Simko, 644 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ohio 1994) (admitting (as an excited ut-
terance) a nod by an intubated victim responding to a police question). In Simko, the prosecu-
tion also attempted to introduce the victim’s statement as a dying declaration. See id. at 351-52.
A dying declaration is an exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant is (obviously) un-
available. The Ohio rules define a dying declaration as “a statement made by a declarant, while
believing that his or her death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the
declarant believed to be his or her impending death.” OHIO R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (West 1994).
Because the Simko court determined that the victim did not believe that death was imminent,
the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration. See Simko, 644 N.E.2d at 351-52.
30. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(1); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 271, at
200-04 (discussing present sense impressions generally).
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has also been applied.31 This exception, however, is used less fre-
quently than the excited utterance exception because it requires more
precise contemporaneity.32 Other exceptions that have been used, of-
ten to show instances of prior abuse, include the state of mind excep-
tion,33 the business records exception,34 and the residual exception.35
31. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 973 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (ruling admissible (as a
present sense impression) statements made by the victim in a telephone conversation describing
being held at gunpoint by the defendant).
32. The present sense impression exception allows a slight lapse, recognizing that precise
contemporaneity is not possible. With respect to the excited utterance, there is no set time,
merely the duration of the state of excitement, which will vary depending on the character of
the transaction or event. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) & 803(2) advisory committee’s note; 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 271, at 202-03; see also Browne v. State, 933 P.2d
187, 191 (Nev. 1997) (holding that the trial court, in disregard of the contemporaneity require-
ment, erroneously admitted the victim’s description of abuse as a present sense impression, but
holding further that, since the description was not offered to prove the truth of the matter but to
provide a foundation for the witness’s opinion that the marriage was bad, the statement was not
hearsay).
33. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (excepting from the hearsay rule statements of the de-
clarant’s “then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed,” unless the terms of a will are in
dispute); State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1167-68 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (holding that the victim’s
statements, indicating fear and a desire to end a relationship, helped to explain the defendant’s
motive, a disputed issue at trial, and that they were therefore admissible); State v. Alston, 298
S.E.2d 631, 637 (N.C. 1983) (holding that, although a victim’s statements demonstrating ill will
between the victim and the defendant must be carefully scrutinized, they are admissible to show
premeditation, deliberation, motive, and intent); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§
273-76, at 214-32 (discussing the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule).
34. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (excepting from the hearsay rule any form of record of
“acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnoses” made by a person with knowledge, provided
that the record was kept “in the course of a regularly conducted business activity” and that “it
was the regular practice” of the business to create the type of record); State v. Scott, 471 S.E.2d
605, 617-18 (N.C. 1996) (determining that a form completed by the victim upon entrance to an
abused women’s shelter was admissible as a business record); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 2, §§ 284-94, at 248-70 (discussing the hearsay exception for regularly kept records
generally). This exception is used with less frequency because the exception is generally not ap-
plicable to police reports. See, e.g., State v. Spinks, 607 N.E.2d 1130, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the business records exception does not permit the state to prove its case through
police records or reports); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 296, at 275-78 (dis-
cussing the debate over the restrictions on police reports).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807 (excepting from the hearsay rule statements not specifically
covered under another exception but having “equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness,” pro-
vided that the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, that it is more probative on the
point than other evidence that can be procured through reasonable efforts, and that the inter-
ests of justice are best served by inclusion); State v. Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484, 489-90 (finding rea-
sons to admit certain statements into the record even though they did not fall “within a firmly-
rooted exception to the hearsay rule”) (Minn. 1995); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
2, § 324, at 343-51 (discussing residual hearsay exceptions generally); see also infra notes 62-63
and accompanying text.
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B. Situations in Which the Domestic Violence Victim Is Alive
Where the victim of domestic violence is still alive, the prosecu-
tion problem is more complex. Many domestic violence victims are
unwilling to testify against their abusers.36 This unwillingness may re-
sult in the victim’s either dropping the charges or refusing to appear
as a witness, both of which often lead to a dismissal of the case.37 A
number of jurisdictions, however, have adopted “no-drop” policies,
under which a victim cannot freely withdraw a complaint once formal
charges have been filed. In these jurisdictions, the prosecutor’s discre-
tion to drop a case because the victim is unwilling to cooperate is lim-
ited.38 Even in these jurisdictions, however, the prosecutor faces an
uphill battle if a victim is unwilling to testify because the prosecutor
must provide evidence of domestic violence without the direct testi-
mony of the victim.39
36. For example, according to the experience of the city attorney’s office in Duluth, Minne-
sota, only 4% of domestic violence victims were actively willing to testify against their abusers.
See Mary Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Effective
Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE
L. REV. 115, 139 & n.108 (1991). For a discussion of some of the reasons why victims are un-
willing to testify, see infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
37. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 87 (2d ed. 1996) (estimating that attrition rates for victim-initiated cases
range between 60-80%).
38. See Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 856 (1994). No-
drop policies are controversial because of the potential conflict between the victim’s concern for
her future safety and the goal of bringing domestic violence perpetrators to justice. For a discus-
sion of the merits of such policies, compare Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job De-
scription for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 183, 190-91 (1997) (“Perversely, in all too many cases, the effect of mandatory
policies is to align the battered woman with her batterer, to protect him, and to further entrench
her in the abusive relationship.”), with Wills, supra note 17, at 180 (“A ‘no drop’ policy means
prosecutors will not allow batterers to control the system of justice through their victims.”); see
also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 37, at 177-81 (advancing six justifications for “no-drop”
policies); Kalyani Robbins, No-Drop Prosecutions of Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy or
Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205, 216 (1999) (“With a no-drop policy, either
the victim must testify or the prosecutor must use other evidence . . . but either way the case
must proceed to trial.”).
39. See Asmus et al., supra note 36, at 139. This problem would also be evident in a juris-
diction that does not have a “no-drop” policy, but decides to continue prosecution despite a vic-
tim’s unwillingness to testify. Such a situation would be rare, however, because of a general re-
luctance on the part of prosecutors to prosecute domestic violence cases. Cf. Corsilles, supra
note 38, at 867 (“Because the victim is often the only witness to the violence, such cases can be
extremely difficult to prove without the victim’s testimony.”). This reluctance stems from a
combination of factors ranging from a failure to understand the dynamics of domestic violence
to a desire to achieve higher conviction rates while conserving limited prosecutorial resources.
See id. at 866-70.
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A victim’s decision not to testify may be motivated by several
factors. First, a victim may be dissatisfied with the criminal justice sys-
tem once she enters it.40 This dissatisfaction may arise because the vic-
tim is simply unprepared for the realities of the criminal justice proc-
ess,41 or because court personnel make the victim feel personally
responsible for her abuse.42 Second, the victim may be subject to
physical retaliation or intimidation by the offender.43 The offender
may also provoke the victim’s fears of economic harm by threatening
loss of financial support.44 Third, the cyclical nature of domestic abuse
can result in a lull in abuse, during which a reconciliation may occur
between the victim and the abuser.45 The continuing criminal case
may be the only reminder of the incident, and, given the positive cur-
rent state of the relationship, the victim may become unwilling to tes-
tify.46 Fourth, many victims may partially or entirely attribute the
cause of the abuse to their own conduct.47 This self-accusation, com-
40. See Corsilles, supra note 38, at 870 (cataloguing the ways in which battered women can
be disappointed with the modern criminal justice process).
41. See id. (“Like other victims, battered women are unprepared for the number of court
appearances, the lack of input they have about plea negotiations and sentencing, and the
amount of protection the defendant receives for his constitutional rights.”).
42. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 37, at 87 (arguing that prosecutorial staff are not
aware of the violation to the public order engendered by such abuses and are thus ambivalent
about intervening in private disputes).
43. See id. at 88 (noting that nearly half of the victims in one study reported that their as-
sailants had threatened them and that 25% of those victims’ assailants had threatened to kidnap
the victims’ children if they continued court procedures) (citing A. KLEIN, SPOUSAL/PARTNER
ASSAULT: A PROTOCOL FOR THE SENTENCING AND SUPERVISION OF OFFENDERS (1994));
Corsilles, supra note 38, at 870 & n.126 (“A domestic abuse victim is more than twice as likely as
other victims of violent crimes to be revictimized within six months after the assault that gave
rise to the legal intervention.” (referencing Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal
Justice System, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 624, 625 (1993))).
44. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 37, at 88-89. In addition to threats, victims also
encounter real possibilities of indirect economic harm by continuing prosecution, including the
offender’s possible loss of job, loss of alimony or child support, and actual out-of-pocket ex-
penses in the event of a conviction or extensive court time. Direct economic harm may also re-
sult if the victim is required to take time from her own job and to arrange for child care to make
court appearances. See id.; see also Corsilles, supra note 38, at 871 (“[W]here the woman has no
income independent of the batterer, the decision to continue prosecution may result in destitu-
tion for the entire family.”).
45. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 37, at 89 (noting that the “cyclic nature” of bat-
tering may result in “honeymoons” without abuse); see also LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 55-70 (1979) (delineating the three phases in the cycle theory of violence); Joan M.
Schroeder, Note, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a Batterer, 76
IOWA L. REV. 553, 557-59 (1991) (discussing generally the cycle theory of violence).
46. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 37, at 89 (noting that continuing the prosecution
can end a “harmonious” period between the couple).
47. See id. (“Feminists would, of course, observe that such a result is predictable given the
socialization process reinforced by constant societal pressure.”); Schroeder, supra note 45, at
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bined with the cyclical nature of an abusive relationship, may be
symptomatic of battered woman syndrome, one explanation of why
some women remain in abusive relationships.48 Finally, the victim may
use the threat of prosecution to gain control in an abusive relation-
ship. The actual prosecution may be of secondary importance to the
victim, as long as she gains a measure of control.49
If the victim decides not to cooperate in a domestic violence
prosecution, her decision can manifest itself in several ways. First, the
victim may recant prior statements. For example, the victim may give
a statement to law enforcement authorities immediately following a
domestic violence incident, then disavow her statement at trial, as in
the situation described in the Introduction.50 In that example, because
of these inconsistencies, the prosecutor was able to apply Hawaii’s
prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule,51 as well as
the exception for excited utterances.52
Second, a victim may not remember, or may claim not to re-
member, the abusive incident when testifying at trial.53 For example,
558 (“Battered women . . . place blame for the battering on their own failures or external situa-
tions.”).
48. See Schroeder, supra note 45, at 557-61 (considering various explanations of why
women remain with their batterers). The theory of battered woman syndrome was first intro-
duced by Lenore Walker and has two general components: the cycle of violence and learned
helplessness. The cycle of violence involves three phases: a tension-building phase, an acute bat-
tering phase, and a calming phase. See WALKER, supra note 45, at 55-70. Learned helplessness is
a belief, acquired by an abused woman, that she cannot control what happens to her. See id. at
42-54.
49. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 37, at 90 (“[T]he criminal justice system is used
as a strategic tool of the victim . . . .”); Corsilles, supra note 38, at 872 (“Some victims withdraw
from prosecution because they have effectively wielded the threat of prosecution as a ‘power
resource’ in bargaining for their own safety.”).
50. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
51. See State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Haw. 1996). The prior inconsistent statement
exception is often used in situations in which the victim recants her prior statements. See, e.g.,
State v. Borelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1109-10 (Conn. 1993); State v. Tomas, 933 P.2d 90, 95 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1997); State v. MacArthur, 644 A.2d 68, 70 (N.H. 1994). The application of this exception
can vary depending on how broadly or narrowly a particular jurisdiction writes or interprets its
statute. See infra Part II.A.2 for a more detailed discussion of these variations.
52. See Clark, 926 P.2d at 202-03 (finding that the victim’s statements to the responding
officer and the emergency room physician could be classified as excited utterances).
53. A domestic violence victim could be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”), of which memory loss is one symptom. See Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front:
Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the Violence Against Women Act, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
665, 702 (1998) (noting the similarities between PTSD and “rape trauma syndrome”); Joan S.
Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Do-
mestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1312-14 (1993) (identifying
in battered women the three symptoms associated with PTSD).
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in State v. Todd,54 a victim who had been recently battered recounted
to several individuals the events that led to her injuries, and her
statements implicated the defendant.55 At trial, however, the victim
claimed that she could not remember how she had received her inju-
ries. As a result, much of the prosecution’s case relied on the hearsay
statements of the people to whom the victim had spoken regarding
the source of her injuries.56 The trial court admitted these statements
under the excited utterance, present sense impression, and state of
mind exceptions to the hearsay rule.57
The third situation occurs when the victim simply does not ap-
pear. For example, in Jay v. State,58 the victim disappeared three
weeks prior to trial.59 Despite a good-faith effort to locate the victim,
the state could not find her, and the trial was held, with the trial court
admitting victim’s statements under the res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule.60
54. 954 P.2d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
55. See id. at 2-3.
56. See id. at 3. Affirming the trial court, the appellate court noted that the victim had ini-
tially indicated that she did not want to press charges, and it held that, for the purposes of hear-
say exceptions, the victim was not “unavailable” simply because she claimed that she could not
remember the incident, implying that a sincere loss of memory would render the victim unavail-
able for the purposes of hearsay exceptions. See id. at 3, 5 (“‘This is not a case where a witness,
acting in good faith, was unable to testify as to the subject matter of her prior statement be-
cause, through no fault of her own, she had lost her memory in regard to such events.’” (quoting
State v. Lomax, 608 P.2d 959, 967 (Kan. 1980))). Allowing sincere memory loss to be treated as
“unavailability” for the purposes of hearsay exceptions expands the Kansas hearsay rule defin-
ing term, which does not specifically include lack of memory as a situation in which a witness is
considered unavailable. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-459(g) (1994). Hence, the Kansas court ex-
panded the unavailability exception to make it more consistent with the Federal Rule, which
includes lack of memory as a situation in which a witness is considered unavailable. See FED. R.
EVID. 804(a)(3). The Federal Rules further provide that a witness who simply persists in refus-
ing to testify is unavailable. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2). This is not the law in Kansas. See State
v. Johnson-Howell, 881 P.2d 1288, 1295-96 (Kan. 1994) (holding that a witness’s refusal to testify
did not make him an unavailable witness as defined by KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-459(g)).
57. See Todd, 954 P.2d at 5-7. The appellate court ruled that the trial court had incorrectly
applied two of the hearsay exceptions (the present sense impression and statement of physical
or mental conditions exceptions), but that the errors were harmless. See id. at 7. This points out
a subsidiary issue with which prosecutors (and defendants alike) must deal: errors involving the
admissibility of hearsay, or any other evidence, rarely result in a reversal. See Margaret A.
Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 893, 894 (1992) (finding only 30 out of 20,000 cases, during a two-year period, in which a
court of appeals stated that its reversal was due to an evidentiary error).
58. 503 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
59. See id. at 564.
60. See id. Georgia’s res gestae exception is, generally speaking, the functional equivalent
of an excited utterance, present sense impression, or state of mind exception. These exceptions
grew out of the common law theory of res gestae, which, aside from its continuing use in Geor-
gia, is now considered an antiquated concept. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §
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C. Framing the Prosecution Problem
The previous discussion of exceptions under which hearsay evi-
dence has been allowed in domestic violence cases is not intended to
be comprehensive. In any given case, the use of other exceptions will
be defined by the potential evidence available, as well as the skill and
creativity of the prosecutor.61 In many instances, however, the hearsay
evidence will not fit within any of the established exceptions. If the
statement does not fall under an established exception, but has “par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” a residual hearsay excep-
tion may accommodate the statement.62 If the statement does not
have such guarantees of trustworthiness, however, or if the state does
not have a residual exception,63 the hearsay statement is generally
ruled inadmissible, and the prosecutor is in danger of losing what is
possibly his most valuable evidence. As a result, the prosecution
stands a greater chance of losing the case, a batterer may go free, and
the victim’s life may be further endangered. Further complicating
matters is the fact that, in all contexts, appellate judges often decline
to reverse a decision strictly on the basis of an incorrect hearsay rul-
ing by the trial judge, finding the error harmless or the evidence cu-
mulative.64 This factor makes it all the more critical that the correct
judgment regarding the hearsay evidence be made at the trial level.
Perhaps the most well-known case involving such inadmissible
hearsay evidence is the O.J. Simpson case. In his trial for murdering
268, at 196 (“The ancient phrase [res gestae] can be jettisoned . . . .”). The Georgia exception
specifically states that “[d]eclarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in
time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible as part of the
res gestae.” GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-3 (1995).
61. See Asmus et al., supra note 36, at 139 (arguing that “an affirmative, skilled use of the
rules of evidence” can allow a jury to hear the facts of a case in which the victim is a reluctant or
hostile witness).
62. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Because the residual exception is not consid-
ered a “firmly rooted” exception for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause, see Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990), the statement must have “particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. It is not immediately clear if this requirement necessitates a
stronger showing of trustworthiness than the residual exception itself, which, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, requires “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” FED. R.
EVID. 807. See Part III.B.2 for a more complete analysis of Confrontation Clause issues.
63. Of the 41 states with codes of evidence generally paralleling the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 14 do not have a residual exception for criminal cases. See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-159 to T-162 (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997).
64. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1168-69 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (finding a “great
deal” of admissible evidence proving that the defendant had acted with premeditation, despite
the admission of some hearsay evidence); see also Berger supra note 57, at 894-95 (providing
further examples of “harmless error” analysis).
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his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Ronald Goldman, the prose-
cution attempted to show that Simpson had a history of prior abuse of
Nicole. Entries from Nicole’s diary, however, and numerous other
statements she had made describing the defendant’s violence and
threats, were ruled inadmissible hearsay.65 In determining that the
statements did not fall within an established exception, Judge Lance
Ito reflected on the powerful hearsay statements:
To the man or woman on the street, the relevance and probative
value of such evidence is both obvious and compelling, especially
those statements made just days before the homicide. It seems only
just and right that a crime victim’s own words be heard, especially in
the court where the facts and circumstances of her demise are to be
presented. However, the laws and appellate court decisions that
must be applied by the trial court hold otherwise.66
The subsequent acquittal of O.J. Simpson—after nearly all of the evi-
dence of prior domestic violence had been ruled inadmissible67—may
be a perfect example of the problem faced by prosecutors. Without
the hearsay evidence the prosecutors were unable to develop an im-
portant component of their case, and the jury was never given the op-
portunity to consider the magnitude of the prior abuse.
To address these issues, some jurisdictions have chosen to ex-
pand existing hearsay exceptions,68 while one jurisdiction, California,
has adopted legislation to attempt to remedy this problem.69 The re-
mainder of this Note evaluates these attempted solutions, discusses
the arguments for, and barriers to, a legislative solution, and, finally,
considers the elements of such an exception that would be required
for fairness.
II. THE EXPANSION OF EXISTING HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES
The approach taken by some jurisdictions to remedy the prose-
cution problem described in Part I is to expand the meaning of exist-
ing hearsay exceptions. Simply expanding the existing exceptions and
65. See Ruling, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *5-*7 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
66. Id. at *5.
67. See id. (admitting only a 911 tape and not admitting other statements indicating domes-
tic violence as inadmissible hearsay).
68. See infra Part II.
69. See infra Part III.C.
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exclusions beyond their conventional meaning, however, threatens to
erode the integrity of the hearsay rule.
A. Hearsay Exceptions and Exclusions Subject to Expansion
To some extent, all hearsay exceptions and exclusions are suscep-
tible to expansion. The following examples highlight the practice of
some jurisdictions with respect to particular exceptions. These exam-
ples are not intended to constitute a comprehensive list, but rather to
offer a reflection of this approach and its pitfalls.
1. The State of Mind Exception.70 A prosecutor is interested in
establishing facts that would lead a jury to conclude that the defen-
dant committed a particular crime. Although a victim’s description of
her state of mind is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule,71
the exception excludes statements of memory or belief that introduce
underlying facts serving as the basis for the victim’s state of mind. Un-
fortunately for prosecutors in domestic violence cases, these facts are
precisely the information in which they are most interested. Thus,
there may be a tendency to try to introduce more than just the state
of mind or, at the very least, to create an inference of the underlying
facts. However, the restriction of statements of memory or belief is
well grounded, as indicated in the Federal Rules of Evidence.72 To
permit a statement of memory or belief into evidence would threaten
to swallow up the hearsay rule by “allowing state of mind, provable
by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the
happening of the event which produced the state of mind.”73
70. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (excepting from the hearsay rule statements of the de-
clarant’s “then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent,
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed,” unless the terms of a will are in
dispute). State rules of evidence are generally equivalent. See 6 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 63, at T-113 to T-116.
71. The relevance of state of mind evidence, as well as a balancing of probativity versus
prejudicial impact, must still be considered prior to admissibility. See FED. R. EVID. 401-03; 1
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 184-85, at 636-48.
72. The Federal Rules specifically exclude statements of memory or belief from being ex-
cepted from the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 2, § 276, at 227-32 (discussing generally the exclusion of such statements).
73. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee’s note; see also Shepard v. United States, 290
U.S. 96, 105-06 (1933) (“Declarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been
sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past. There
would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored.”).
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In some jurisdictions, however, this aspect of the rule is essen-
tially ignored.74 For instance, the language of the North Carolina state
of mind exception is identical to the Federal Rule,75 yet the North
Carolina courts limit the restriction of statements of memory or belief
to statements that relate only factual events.76 If the facts contained in
the victim’s statement serve to demonstrate the basis for her state of
mind, the statements relating factual events are not excluded.77 For
example, in State v. Scott,78 the victim’s statements that the defendant
had caused her injuries in the past and that she was afraid of the de-
fendant were admitted under the state of mind exception.79
Similarly, in a Tennessee case, the victim’s statement to her boy-
friend that she did not want him to come by her house because she
was afraid that his being there would cause a conflict with her es-
tranged husband was ruled admissible under the state of mind excep-
tion.80 Although the trial court admitted the statement because it felt
that the statement was merely cumulative,81 the Tennessee Supreme
Court admitted the statement explicitly under the state of mind ex-
ception and stated that it was relevant to show the victim’s plans and
to explain why she did not see her boyfriend that day.82 The court ac-
knowledged that the statement could be used improperly, i.e., to es-
tablish the defendant’s conduct, but indicated that, because the rec-
ord included other testimony that the defendant and the victim were
together that particular day, the potentially improper use was not de-
terminative.83 Although the evidence may have been cumulative to
74. Jurisdictions which allow statements of memory to be admissible under the state of
mind exception in domestic violence cases will often do so in other cases as well. For example,
the North Carolina courts expand the state of mind exception in domestic violence homicide
cases to admit facts that serve as the basis of the declarant’s state of mind. See infra notes 75-79
and accompanying text. This expansion is equally applicable to non–domestic violence cases.
See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 488 S.E.2d 769, 776-77 (N.C. 1997) (expanding the state of mind excep-
tion in a case involving a defendant who had handled real estate and horse sales for the victim);
State v. Miller, 477 S.E.2d 915, 925-26 (N.C. 1996) (expanding the state of mind exception in a
case involving a defendant who was the next-door neighbor of the victim).
75. See N.C. R. EVID. 803(3).
76. See State v. Hardy, 451 S.E.2d 600, 612 (N.C. 1994); State v. Hayes, 502 S.E.2d 853, 866
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
77. See State v. Gray, 491 S.E.2d 538, 550 (N.C. 1997); Hayes, 502 S.E.2d at 866.
78. 471 S.E.2d 605 (N.C. 1996).
79. See id. at 618.
80. See State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 574-75 (Tenn. 1994).
81. See id. at 574 (“The trial court admitted the hearsay apparently because it had to do
with matters that we’ve already considered.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 574-75.
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show the location of the defendant that day, the more damaging part
of the victim’s statement was her fear of a possible conflict and of
violence on the part of the defendant. These statements are precisely
what the exception aims to exclude. Accordingly, the statement
should not have been admitted into evidence based on the Tennessee
Rules of Evidence.84 Although other evidence on this issue may have
been available in the record, the court does not indicate this fact in
the immediate discussion. If this was the case, a more appropriate
ruling would have been for the appellate court to hold that the state-
ment was erroneously admitted, but that the error was harmless.
In domestic violence cases, the state of mind exception is also
commonly used to demonstrate the victim’s fear of the defendant.85
While fear is an expression of a victim’s state of mind, jurisdictions
are split as to whether it is relevant and admissible. Some jurisdictions
follow a narrow interpretation of the exception, noting that a victim’s
fear has no bearing on proving the defendant’s motive and that state
of mind evidence should not be used to prove the conduct of the de-
fendant.86 Other jurisdictions, however, have expanded the exception
and held that the fear of the victim is relevant to show the defendant’s
motive.87
84. See TENN. R. EVID. 803(3). The Tennessee rule is identical to the Federal Rule. See
supra notes 72-73.
85. See Donna Meredith Matthews, Making the Crucial Connection: A Proposed Threat
Hearsay Exception, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 142 (1997) (indicating that when the vic-
tim’s state of mind is an issue most courts admit expressions of fear).
86. See, e.g., People v. Noguera, 842 P.2d 1160, 1171 (Cal. 1992) (“[H]earsay statements of
victims concerning fears of or threats against them by the accused, when offered to prove the
conduct of the accused, are not within the [state of mind] exception to the hearsay rule . . . .”);
State v. Duntz, 613 A.2d 224, 237 (Conn. 1992) (holding that statements of the victim’s fear of
the defendant were not relevant to establishing the defendant’s motive and thus were not ad-
missible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule); Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249,
1254 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that neither fear of the defendant nor conflict avoid-
ance “has any legal significance in establishing the elements of murder or manslaughter”);
Commonwealth v. McGraw, 690 N.E.2d 400, 404 (Mass. 1998) (holding that “evidence of a vic-
tim’s fear of the defendant is not admissible at all to prove motive”).
87. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 881 P.2d 1158, 1167-68 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc) (holding that the
victim’s statements of fear and of a desire to end the relationship helped to explain the defen-
dant’s motive, a disputed issue at trial, and that they were therefore admissible); State v. Alston,
298 S.E.2d 631, 637 (N.C. 1983) (holding that “the use of statements of the victim tending to
show ill will between the defendant and the victim must be carefully scrutinized,” but that they
can be admissible “to show premeditation and deliberation, motive and intent”); Moore v.
State, 761 P.2d 866, 870 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (holding that statements reflecting the victim’s
fear of the defendant were admissible under the state of mind exception because they provided
a motive for the killing).
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2. The Prior Inconsistent Statement Exclusion.88 Another
questionable instance in which some courts are admitting hearsay
involves the prior inconsistent statement. Although prior inconsistent
statements may generally be used for impeachment purposes,89 the
Federal Rules also permit a prior inconsistent statement of a witness
to be used substantively, thereby excluding it from the hearsay rule, if
it was given under oath at an official proceeding or deposition.90
Seemingly, this hearsay exclusion would be very useful in situa-
tions in which the victim recants an earlier statement, but its applica-
tion is restricted by the Federal Rule requirement that the out-of-
court statement be made under oath at an official proceeding or
deposition. For example, in the Federal Rules, the exclusion is not
generally read to extend to statements given to police officers at the
police station or immediately following an incident;91 such statements
would be considered hearsay. The rationale behind this Federal Rule
is that an investigative interrogation by the police is “neither regu-
lated nor regularized [and] contains none of the safeguards involved
in an appearance before a grand jury.”92
However, some states, such as Connecticut, have permitted prior
inconsistent statements to be used substantively in such situations. In
one instance, the court allowed a sworn, written statement that was
made by the victim to the police (but not in any formal proceeding)
and that described the plaintiff’s physical abuse to be admitted sub-
stantively as a prior inconsistent statement after the victim denied the
statement at trial.93 Connecticut allows prior inconsistent statements if
88. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A):
A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . in-
consistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition . . . .
89. See id. 613(b); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 34, at 126:
The attack by prior inconsistent statement is not based on the theory that the present
testimony is false and the former statement true but rather upon the notion that
talking one way on the stand and another way previously is blowing hot and cold,
raising a doubt as to the truthfulness of both statements.
90. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
91. See James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 787, 819 & n.278 (1993) (stating that, for the purposes of the prior inconsistent statement
exclusion, there is “substantial authority that no variation of police investigative activity consti-
tutes a proceeding,” and citing sources). Of course, if a statement meets the criteria of another
hearsay exclusion (such as an admission) or exception (such as an excited utterance), it may still
be admissible as evidence.
92. Delgado-Santos v. State, 471 So. 2d 74, 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
93. See State v. Borrelli, 629 A.2d 1105, 1108 (Conn. 1993).
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a three-part test is met: (1) the declarant signed the statement, (2) the
declarant had personal knowledge of the facts set forth in the state-
ment, and (3) the declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-
examination.94 Connecticut courts have reasoned that a “statement
made under circumstances providing a reasonable assurance of reli-
ability should be admitted to advance the truth finding function of the
jury.”95
Similarly, Hawaii, in its formal evidence code, broadens the prior
inconsistent statement exception by allowing the substantive use of
prior written statements signed by a witness,96 as well as those given in
formal proceedings.97 Hawaii also allows as a prior statement tape-
recordings made contemporaneously with the making of the state-
ment.98 This exception enabled the prosecutors in State v. Clark,99 the
case discussed in the Introduction,100 to use the tape-recorded state-
ment given by the victim to the investigating officer. However, the
concerns discussed previously regarding statements given to police
also apply to tape-recorded statements.101
Additionally, the genesis of the language used in the Hawaii rule
raises questions. The language allowing written and tape-recorded
statements was taken from the federal Jencks Act,102 a federal law that
governs the production or discovery of written or recorded state-
ments made to government agents by government witnesses.103 The
Jencks Act, however, has been interpreted as restricting the use of
such statements to impeachment only.104 Applying the same language
to statements that would be used substantively is, therefore, an ex-
pansion of the prior inconsistent statement rule.
94. See id. at 1108 (citing State v. Whelan, 513 A.2d 86, 92 (Conn. 1986)).
95. Id.; see also Whelan, 513 A.2d at 93 & n.10 (expressing concern over the untrustworthi-
ness of some prior inconsistent statements, but deciding that limiting substantive admissibility
only to statements made in a formal adversarial setting is unnecessary).
96. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1)(B); see also State v. Tomas, 933 P.2d 90, 94-95 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1997) (applying HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1)(B)).
97. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1)(A) (admitting prior inconsistent statements “[g]iven under
oath . . . at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition”).
98. See id. 802.1(1)(C).
99. 926 P.2d 194 (Haw. 1996).
100. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
101. While a tape-recorded statement played in court would certainly provide a guarantee
of accuracy, other concerns underlying the normal inadmissibility of police interviews, such as a
lack of formality, a lack of oath, and the potential for coercion, may still be present, making the
ultimate reliability of the recording questionable. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
102. See HAW. R. EVID. 802.1 commentary.
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
104. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
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3. The Recorded Recollection Exception.105 A Vermont court
took a relatively unique approach to the hearsay problem in domestic
violence cases by admitting a prior tape-recorded statement of the
victim after she claimed, at trial, that she could not remember the
domestic violence.106 As part of his investigation, the police officer
tape-recorded an interview with the victim the day after the assault.107
The prosecutor was successful in admitting this tape-recorded
interview under the recorded recollection exception.108 To be
admissible under this exception, the evidence must meet three
requirements: (1) the record must pertain to matters about which the
declarant once had knowledge, (2) the declarant must have present
insufficient memory, and (3) the record must be shown to have been
made by the declarant or, if made by someone else, to have been
examined by the declarant and shown to reflect accurately the
declarant’s knowledge when the matters were fresh in the declarant’s
memory.109 In affirming the trial court, the Vermont Supreme Court
held that the first two requirements were easily met110—although
there is some question as to whether the court truly believed that the
declarant had present insufficient memory—and that her claimed
memory lapse was not just a subterfuge for recantation.111 After an
extended discussion, the court held that the third requirement was
also met, noting that there was no question that the victim had given
the tape-recorded statement and that evidence presented by the state
was sufficient to show that the statement accurately reflected the
knowledge of the victim.112
105. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (excepting from the hearsay rule a “memorandum or
record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient
recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or
adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’ memory and to reflect that
knowledge correctly”); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 279-83, at 240-47 (dis-
cussing the exception for records of past recollection).
106. See State v. Marcy, 680 A.2d 76 (Vt. 1996).
107. See id. at 77.
108. See id. at 78 (relying on VT. R. EVID. 803(5)). The Vermont Rule is substantively iden-
tical to the Federal Rule. See supra note 105.
109. See Marcy, 680 A.2d at 78 (citing State v. Paquette, 497 A.2d 358, 360 (Vt. 1985)).
110. See id. (finding that “[a]s the victim of the assault, the witness once had knowledge of it,
and her tape-recorded statement relates that knowledge in detail” and noting that the trial court
found that it was “‘clear and without question[] that the declarant now has insufficient recollec-
tion about any matters contained in that tape or . . . concern[ing] what did or did not happen to
her on [the date of the assault]’”).
111. See id. at 83 (Dooley, J., dissenting) (“The reality is that both the trial judge and the
majority believe that this is a case of recantation by convenient memory lapse. That is, they are
skeptical of the victim’s assertion that she remembers neither the assault nor the statement.”).
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B. Implications of the Expansion of Existing Hearsay Exceptions
Hearsay exceptions may be particularly susceptible to expansion
in domestic violence cases because there is a strong social policy in-
terest in reducing domestic violence and because the victim’s own
words seem so “obvious and compelling.”113 However, the expansion
of hearsay exceptions has implications for the broad use of the hear-
say rule.
As discussed in Section III.A.1, a strong social policy argument
can be made for admitting hearsay in domestic violence cases. The
private nature of domestic violence, in which only the victim and the
perpetrator have firsthand knowledge of the incident, makes the need
to use hearsay significant. At the same time, we must recognize that
expanding existing hearsay exceptions would have a significant im-
pact on non–domestic violence cases. For example, by expanding the
state of mind exception in a domestic violence case, the door may be
opened in another, non–domestic violence case, where the policy ar-
guments and the need to use hearsay are not nearly as strong. The
elastic nature of the common law system may allow the interpretation
of these exceptions in domestic violence cases to carry precedential
value in cases in which there is little or no social policy justification,
or necessity, for admitting the hearsay.
Perhaps the only alternative to expanding existing hearsay excep-
tions would be to create a new hearsay exception for use only in the
domestic violence context. The arguments for creating such an excep-
tion, as well as the potential barriers to an exception, are discussed in
the following section.
III. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION? TOWARDS A HEARSAY EXCEPTION
FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
As discussed in the previous section, the practice of expanding
existing exceptions in order to admit hearsay in domestic violence
cases is not the best solution. If the use of hearsay statements in do-
mestic violence cases is to be permitted, it would be more appropriate
to create a new hearsay exception confined to the domestic violence
112. See id. at 79 (detailing the trial court’s findings that the victim was coherent and re-
sponsive when she made the statement and that the statement was made within a day of the as-
sault, that it was consistent with a prior interview, that it related the details of the assault
chronologically, that it was corroborated by other witnesses, and that it was never recanted).
113. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18,
1995).
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context. Such an exception would be tailored to serve the dual pur-
pose of meeting the needs of domestic violence prosecutors and of
ensuring fairness and constitutional protections for the defendant.
A. Arguments for a Hearsay Exception for Domestic Violence
A new hearsay exception for domestic violence is an appropriate
solution for two primary reasons. First, there is a strong social policy
interest in reducing domestic violence: a hearsay exception for do-
mestic violence situations would assist prosecutors in bringing domes-
tic violence perpetrators to justice.114 Second, a number of existing
evidence rules have been created primarily in response to policy con-
cerns, not necessarily grounded in the theoretical underpinnings of
evidence rules.115 Thus, even though a proposed hearsay exception for
domestic violence is driven by policy and does not fit fully within the
evidence rules’ theoretical framework, it would be a suitable candi-
date for legislative action.
1. The Social Policy Argument. As described previously,116
domestic violence is a very significant societal, as well as individual,
problem that the criminal justice system needs resources to combat.
The ability of the criminal justice system to do so is complicated by
the fact that most domestic violence assaults usually take place in
private, where only the abuser and the abused know with certainty
what has occurred.117 Although the victim, immediately after the
incident, may make statements to police investigators or others about
what has happened,118 she is often unavailable, or unwilling, to testify
at trial.119 Thus, her story is often left untold.120 In many situations, the
prosecution of domestic violence cases can only be effective if the
hearsay statements of the victim are admissible at trial. A new
114. See infra Part III.A.1.
115. See infra Part III.A.2.
116. See supra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
117. Assaults may often be witnessed by children, see Wills, supra note 17, at 175, but chil-
dren may often be incapable of testifying at a trial, for a variety of reasons. See supra note 19.
118. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 926 P.2d 194, 202-03 (Haw. 1996); State v. Campbell, 539
N.W.2d 491, 493 (Iowa 1995).
119. See supra Part I.
120. See Matthews, supra note 85, at 118-19 (pointing out that in many domestic homicide
cases the victim’s “only witness is herself, and she is dead”); Raeder, supra note 10, at 1469
(“[E]ven in death the criminal justice system may not let the voice of the battered victim tell her
story . . . .”); see also supra Part I (discussing this prosecution problem).
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hearsay exception, covering these situations would allow the full story
to be told.121
2. Precedence in Existing Rules of Evidence. A number of
existing rules of evidence have been implemented primarily for policy
purposes. A clear example of this phenomenon is Rule 413 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which relates to the use of evidence of
similar crimes in sexual assault prosecutions.122 The general rule,
established by the Federal Rules, is that evidence of “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith,”123 although such
evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive.124 Rule 413, however, specifically allows evidence of a prior
sexual assault, and such evidence “may be considered for its bearing
on any matter to which it is relevant.”125 Thus, this rule is an exception
to the general rule previously established. In adopting this rule,
Congress ignored, and deliberately bypassed, the strong opposition of
the Judicial Conference, the body authorized by Congress to
promulgate new rules of evidence.126 Congress justified its decision by
noting both the difficulty in successfully prosecuting rape cases and
the perception that current law is disproportionately favorable to the
defendant in sexual assault prosecutions. These difficulties, Congress
concluded, led to too many rape prosecutions that resulted in
acquittals or reversals on appeal.127
121. In jurisdictions that currently expand existing exceptions, the full story is often able to
be told. Thus, a new hearsay exception would not necessarily provide the same impact in such a
jurisdiction as in a jurisdiction that does not expand existing exceptions. However, as this Note
argues, a new exception is a more appropriate tool for prosecutors than expansion of existing
exceptions.
122. See FED. R. EVID. 413 (admitting certain evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault
cases). The same policies underlying the passage of Rule 413 apply to Rules 414 and 415, which
were adopted at the same time. See id. 414 (admitting certain evidence of similar crimes in child
molestation cases); id. 415 (admitting certain evidence of similar acts in civil cases concerning
sexual assault or child molestation).
123. Id. 404(b).
124. See id.
125. Id. 413(a) (emphasis added).
126. See Michael S. Ellis, Comment, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 971-72 (1998); Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Comment,
Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing “The Credibility Quotient”, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
107, 119-20 (1995).
127. See Mary Katherine Danna, Note, The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The
Prejudice of Politics or Just Plain Common Sense?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 277, 291 (1996) (listing
congressional justifications for Rules 413-15). Several commentators have correlated the height-
ened attention given to sexual assault prosecutions at that time with the highly publicized date
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Many states have adopted a similarly policy-based hearsay ex-
ception for statements made by victims of child sexual abuse.128 These
exceptions have arisen from a set of broad factual determinations and
policy judgments,129 many of which are also present in domestic vio-
lence cases: the sexual assaults often occur in the home, with few wit-
nesses, and the child’s out-of-court statements are sometimes the
most important, or only, evidence available to prove abuse.130 The
child may also be unwilling, or unable, to testify for a variety of rea-
sons, including fear of reprisal by the abuser, guilt, age, and capac-
ity.131 Other justifications for the child sexual abuse exception are the
inherent reliability of the statements132 and the belief that children
may be harmed by the trial process.133
The co-conspirator exclusion to the hearsay rule134 is also
founded on policy. Under this provision, a statement is not hearsay if
it is “offered against a party and is . . . a statement by a coconspirator
of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”135
Reliability plays a distinctly secondary role. Rather, the “need for this
evidence, which was particularly valuable in prosecuting a conspiracy,
permitted a somewhat reduced concern for the reliability of the
statement.”136 Thus, existing rules of evidence provide precedent for
rape trial of William Kennedy Smith. See Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in Prosecutions for
Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307, 307-08 (1993); Danna, supra, at 289; Ellis, supra
note 126, at 974.
128. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1994);
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(18a)(b) (Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1999). The Fed-
eral Rules have not adopted this exception.
129. See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under
the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 695 (1993) (de-
scribing the policy judgments behind the hearsay exceptions in child sexual abuse cases).
130. See id.; Jean L. Kelly, Comment, Legislative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases:
The Hearsay Exception and the Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1985).
131. See Mosteller, supra note 129, at 695; Kelly, supra note 130, at 1024.
132. See Mosteller, supra note 129, at 695 (noting that children will rarely lie to authority
figures about sexual activity and that most children do not have sufficient knowledge about sex-
ual functioning to lie effectively).
133. See id. (pointing out that “although not universally true, in-court testimony by a child
may produce emotional and psychological trauma that in some instances will be long-lasting”).
134. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 259, at
156-60 (discussing the co-conspirator exclusion).
135. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
136. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 190 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun also noted that, despite limited guarantees of trustworthiness, see id. at 191, courts
have justified the admission of a co-conspirator’s hearsay statements by arguing that a “party
could not complain of the deprivation of the right to cross-examine himself . . . or to advocate
his own, or his agent’s, untrustworthiness,” id. at 190. See also Raeder, supra note 10, at 1512
(questioning why a similar need-based exception never arose for domestic abuse threats in mur-
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the creation of rules with an eye toward policy and of hearsay excep-
tions based primarily on need, as opposed to reliability.137
B. Obstacles to a Hearsay Exception for Domestic Violence
Although there are strong arguments for creating a new excep-
tion to the hearsay rule for domestic violence, obstacles exist. These
hurdles arise from the traditional concerns relating to hearsay excep-
tions—confrontation, corresponding trustworthiness guarantees, and
necessity—but, in the end, they boil down to the need to preserve an
accused’s right to a fair trial.
1. Confrontation. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.”138 There are numerous exceptions to the Confrontation Clause,
and, through a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has provided
guidance for the application of the Confrontation Clause to hearsay
statements.139 In Ohio v. Roberts,140 the Court set out a two-part test
for admitting hearsay evidence when the Confrontation Clause is im-
plicated. First, hearsay evidence may be introduced only when the de-
clarant is produced or the unavailability of the declarant is demon-
strated.141 Second, the statement must have been made under
circumstances providing sufficient “‘indicia of reliability.’”142 The
Court held further that a statement falling under a “firmly rooted
hearsay exception” is sufficiently reliable.143 If the evidence does not
fall within such an exception, “particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness are required for admission.”144 The Court has since backed
away from the unavailability requirement, and, at present, unavail-
ability of the declarant is required only when the particular hearsay
exception requires it.145
der cases).
137. For Confrontation Clause purposes, a degree of reliability would still be required. See
infra Part III.B.1.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
139. See generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 252, at 124-29 (document-
ing the series of decisions).
140. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
141. See id. at 65.
142. Id. at 66.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819-22
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In subsequent decisions, the Court has provided additional guid-
ance for statements that do not fall into a “firmly rooted exception.”
In Idaho v. Wright,146 the Court instructed that the guarantees of
trustworthiness reflect the “totality of the circumstances that sur-
round the making of the statement and that render the declarant par-
ticularly worthy of belief.”147 The Court also specifically rejected the
use of corroborative evidence, stating that the hearsay evidence
“must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustwor-
thiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.”148
Any new exception to the hearsay rule will clearly not be a
“firmly rooted” exception under Roberts. Therefore, a hearsay state-
ment admitted under the exception must have “particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness.” Other evidence of domestic violence, while
relevant to the case, also could not be used to support the introduc-
tion of a hearsay statement admitted under a newly created domestic
violence exception. The statement must be able to stand the test of
trustworthiness on its own. While this obstacle is not impossible to
overcome, it provides a much larger hurdle and could severely restrict
the applicability of a new exception.
2. Trustworthiness Guarantees. Because a new exception would
not be “firmly rooted,” current Confrontation Clause interpretation
requires that a statement have “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.” In-court witnesses are subject to three conditions
that provide such a guarantee of trustworthiness: oath, personal
presence, and cross-examination.149 These elements are not present
for the declarant of a hearsay statement. As such, other guarantees of
trustworthiness are required. For example, the reliability of the
excited utterance exception is guaranteed because excitement
“temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances
free of conscious fabrication.”150 Similarly, the reliability of the
medical diagnosis exception is founded on the strong motivation of
(1990); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391-400 (1986); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 252, at 124.
146. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
147. Id. at 820.
148. Id. at 822.
149. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 245, at 93.
150. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note; see also 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 272, at 204-05 (discussing the rationale of the exception).
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the patient to provide truthful information for purposes of medical
treatment.151
In the domestic violence context, hearsay statements not falling
under an existing exception may not have particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness. When, for example, the victim of domestic vio-
lence tells her story to the police, the victim is usually not under oath,
the jurors cannot observe the demeanor of the victim when she makes
the statement, and the defense counsel cannot cross-examine the vic-
tim. Thus, a new exception would have to include some requirement
that would help to guarantee trustworthiness. One potential require-
ment is the use of videotape. Presentation of the videotape at trial
could act as a partial substitute for personal presence. A videotaped
statement could also be made under oath, which would provide an
additional factor in determining reliability. The potential applicability
of a videotape requirement, as well as general requirements for
trustworthiness in a new exception, are discussed in Section IV.C.
3. Necessity. Although trustworthiness guarantees are a
necessary component of a new hearsay exception, the need to permit
hearsay statements can provide additional support for the creation of
an exception. Without a necessity basis, a new exception would be
much more difficult to justify.
Necessity plays a role in several hearsay exceptions, particularly
those in which unavailability is a requirement. Statements falling
within a hearsay exception for which unavailability is required152 are
recognized as being less reliable than in-court testimony.153 However,
because the admission of hearsay evidence is preferred to losing the
evidence of the declarant entirely,154 courts may admit hearsay, sub-
ject to other evidentiary considerations such as relevance.
Other exceptions and exclusions also have foundations in neces-
sity. The assurance of the reliability of the state of mind exception, for
151. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note; 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 2, § 277, at 233 (discussing the reliability of this exception).
152. See FED. R. EVID. 804 (defining “[u]navailability as a witness”).
153. See id. 804(b) advisory committee’s note (preferring live testimony over hearsay); 3
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1829 (7th ed. 1998)
(noting that statements falling within the unavailability exception are not as reliable as in-court
testimony).
154. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) advisory committee’s note (preferring hearsay over the com-
plete loss of the evidence); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 253, at 126-31 (dis-
cussing hearsay exceptions where the declarant is unavailable); 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra
note 153, at 1829 (recognizing that “statements are better than no evidence at all”).
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example, rests on the spontaneity and apparent sincerity of the state-
ments.155 However, the exception does not explicitly require trustwor-
thiness, and the declarant could conceivably fabricate his state of
mind.156 A necessity basis—that the individual has a unique perspec-
tive on his own state of mind and, therefore, that no better way exists
to prove state of mind than through the individual’s statements157—
strengthens the rationale for the state of mind exception. Similarly,
the co-conspirator exclusion158 and the child sexual abuse exception159
also have a strong foundation in the necessity of the statement, as
opposed to, or in addition to, trustworthiness guarantees.
Domestic violence victims are often unavailable, either voluntar-
ily or involuntarily.160 Additionally, as with child sexual abuse cases,161
the victims are frequently the only source of information regarding
the assault, and they are often unwilling to testify.162 The need for the
hearsay statements is itself sufficient to warrant the creation of a new
exception.163 However, to be fair to the defendant and to comply with
the Confrontation Clause, such an exception must also have guaran-
tees of trustworthiness.
Furthermore, it is often the case that a victim will refuse to testify
or to recant an earlier story out of fear of physical or economic repri-
sals from the batterer.164 Threats by the batterer, if proved, could be
grounds for using a forfeiture by wrongdoing exception—such as that
recently included in the Federal Rules165—which is designed to pre-
155. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 274, at 217; 3 SALTZBURG ET AL.,
supra note 153, at 1656.
156. See 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 153, at 1661.
157. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 274, at 217-18; 3 SALTZBURG ET AL.,
supra note 153, at 1656.
158. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part I.
161. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
163. Cf. Raeder, supra note 10, at 1512-13 (suggesting that a “[l]ack of sensitivity to the
problem of proof in domestic femicide cases” may explain why an exception has not been cre-
ated for domestic abuse threats, even though a similar problem of proof was a significant factor
in leading to the creation of the co-conspirator exclusion).
164. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
165. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that, if the declarant is unavailable as a witness,
a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the statement was “offered against a party that
has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavail-
ability of the declarant as a witness.” FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). This exception was added to the
Federal Rules in 1997. See id. advisory committee’s note.
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vent witness tampering.166 The problem is that, in order for the excep-
tion to apply, witness tampering must be shown by a preponderance
of the evidence.167 Because, in most situations, the prosecution could
show only the possibility that the victim is reluctant to testify because
of fear of the defendant, this exception would be difficult to apply.
Thus, the problem of proof for this exception underscores the need
for a new exception.
C. The California Example
In 1996, the California legislature took these concerns into ac-
count and enacted a new hearsay exception that allows admission of
hearsay statements that explain the infliction or threat of physical in-
jury upon the declarant.168 This exception was passed in the wake of
the O.J. Simpson murder trial,169 in which Nicole Brown Simpson’s
diaries and other statements of threats and violence were ruled inad-
missible.170
Under section 1370, a hearsay statement may be admissible171 if
several conditions are met. First, the statement must purport to “nar-
rate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury
upon the declarant.”172 This condition would include statements de-
scribing the infliction of the injury that is the subject of the case, as
well as past incidents of violence or threats. These statements of
memory are explicitly not protected by the existing state of mind ex-
ception in the Federal Rules,173 but, for this new California exception,
166. See id. (“[The rule] applies to actions taken after the event to prevent a witness from
testifying.”); Raeder, supra note 10, at 1515 (“When the defendant’s actions amount to witness
tampering, it is easier to argue that the accused should not profit from wrongdoing.”).
167. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (“The usual Rule 104(a) pre-
ponderance of evidence standard has been adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule
804(b)(6) seeks to discourage.”); see, e.g., United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting that in the past it has held that, if it is found that a defendant procured the absence of a
witness, the defendant has waived her Sixth Amendment rights and the right to object on hear-
say grounds).
168. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1999).
169. See Karleen F. Murphy, Note, A Hearsay Exception for Physical Abuse, 27 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1997).
170. See Ruling, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 21768, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 18, 1995). See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
171. More specifically, section 1370 provides that a hearsay statement “is not made inadmis-
sible by the hearsay rule . . . .” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a) (West Supp. 1999). A statement may
still be inadmissible for other reasons such as relevance or prejudice.
172. Id. § 1370(a)(1).
173. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) (excepting from the hearsay rule statements of the declar-
ant’s “then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan,
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the state of mind is not at issue, but rather the events themselves. This
exception makes no change to the existing rule of disallowing state-
ments of belief,174 perhaps on the theory that statements of memory
relate directly to actions taken by the defendant, whereas statements
of belief are only indirectly related.
Second, the declarant must be unavailable by reason of privilege,
disqualification, death, illness, or other conditions defined in section
240 of the California Evidence Code.175 This condition is consistent
with the necessity basis for allowing hearsay statements when a wit-
ness is unavailable.176 By restricting its definition of unavailability, the
second condition eliminates many instances in which the victim is
voluntarily unavailable, such as when a victim recants prior state-
ments, claims not to remember the incident, or simply chooses not to
testify at trial.
Third, the statement must have been made “at or near the time
of the infliction or threat of physical injury,”177 and it must also have
been “in writing, . . . electronically recorded, or made to a law en-
forcement official.”178 These requirements are somewhat analogous to
the Federal Rules’ exception for a past recollection recorded state-
ment.179 In both situations, a guarantee of trustworthiness is found in
the reliability inherent in a record made while events were fresh in an
individual’s mind and they can be accurately reflected.180 A significant
difference is that the past recollection recorded statement generally
requires the declarant to be a witness,181 whereas section 1370 requires
unavailability. The exception also specifically allows statements made
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of mem-
ory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed,” unless the terms of a will are in dis-
pute).
174. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1250(b) (West 1995) (“This section does not make admissible
evidence of a statement of . . . belief to prove the fact . . . believed.”). For example, the state-
ment “I think he’s going to kill me” expresses the belief of a declarant and therefore would be
inadmissible.
175. See id. § 1370(a)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
176. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
177. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
178. Id. § 1370(a)(5).
179. See supra note 105. The California exception is substantially similar. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1237 (West 1995).
180. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee’s note.
181. A requirement in the California past recollection recorded exception is that the state-
ment be introduced “after the witness testifies that the statement he made was a true statement
of such fact.” CAL. EVID. CODE § 1237(3) (West 1995). The Federal Rule does not explicitly
require the testimony of the witness, but the language referring to the memory of the witness
implies availability. See supra note 105.
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to law enforcement officials.182 As discussed previously, the trustwor-
thiness of statements made to law enforcement officials may be
somewhat questionable.183 Additionally, the exception excludes
statements made more than five years before the filing of the current
proceeding.184 Although this condition does not provide any greater
guarantee of trustworthiness,185 it does exclude statements that may
no longer be relevant. This is somewhat analogous, in a relevance
sense, to the Federal Rule addressing impeachment of witnesses that
excludes evidence of a witness’s conviction of a crime if the convic-
tion is more than ten years old.186 Here, however, the prior statement
would not be introduced for impeachment purposes, but it would
come dangerously close to being introduced to show the character of
the accused in order to show action in conformity with that character.
This type of evidence is explicitly prohibited, although the evidence
would still be permissible for another purpose, such as to show mo-
tive, intent, identity, or opportunity.187 With the exception of intent as
it relates to threats, any of these other purposes would be inapplica-
ble. One commentator proposes a domestic abuse character excep-
tion to deal explicitly with this problem.188
Fourth, the statement must have been made “under circum-
stances that would indicate its trustworthiness.”189 The rule provides
further guidance in the determination of trustworthiness, citing as
relevant factors “[w]hether the statement was made in contemplation
of pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was inter-
ested,”190 “[w]hether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabricating
the statement, and the extent of any bias or motive,”191 and “[w]hether
182. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(5) (West Supp. 1999).
183. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Evidence Law—Hearsay Rule—California Adopts Hear-
say Exception Making Written Statements by Unavailable Witnesses That Describe Past Physical
Abuse Admissible in Civil and Criminal Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 805, 809 (1997) [hereinafter
Evidence Law] (“[T]he fact that a statement was made verbally to a police officer fails to pro-
vide any indication of the statement’s accuracy or trustworthiness, unless one both accepts the
romantic notion that police officers never distort the truth and believes that police officers’
memories never fail.”).
184. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
185. See Evidence Law, supra note 183, at 809.
186. See FED. R. EVID. 609(b); see also Murphy, supra note 169, at 516 & n.136 (arguing that
the prohibition ensures that the incident is not so remote as to make the statement irrelevant).
187. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(b) (West 1995).
188. See Raeder, supra note 10, at 1505 (proposing to permit relevant evidence of prior do-
mestic violence in relationship cases).
189. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(4) (West Supp. 1999).
190. Id. § 1370(b)(1).
191. Id. § 1370(b)(2).
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the statement is corroborated by evidence other than statements that
are admissible only pursuant to this section.”192 Although the rule
does not consider these the only possible relevant factors, these fac-
tors do not necessarily provide additional guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, particularly given the circumstances under which the rule would
be applied.
Examining the first of these factors, pending litigation, few would
disagree that a statement made in contemplation of litigation may be
untrustworthy because the witness has an interest in the use of the
statement.193 The inverse, however, is not necessarily true. The fact
that a statement was not made in contemplation of litigation does not
mean the statement is trustworthy. Thus, while this factor may defini-
tively exclude a statement, it is of little help in determining whether a
statement is actually trustworthy.
On the surface, the second factor, bias or motive, is troublesome
in light of the circumstances under which the hearsay exception is ap-
plied. Because the statement must be made “at or near the time of the
infliction or threat of physical injury,”194 there is a strong likelihood
that the declarant’s anger could result in bias. However, applying this
type of analysis would essentially eliminate all relevant statements.
Thus, a deeper examination of the presence of bias is necessary to de-
termine the untrustworthiness of the statement.
The third factor, whether the statement is corroborated by oth-
ers, poses the most significant problem: it conflicts with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Idaho v. Wright.195 In that case, the Court indicated
that the particular guarantees of trustworthiness required for admis-
192. Id. § 1370(b)(3).
193. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113-15 (1943) (finding the primary utility of rail-
road accident records to be in “litigating, not in railroading,” and holding records inadmissible
because they were not “made ‘in the regular course’ of business”); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(6)
advisory committee’s note (discussing the motives of the preparer of business records and the
admissibility of such records under the exception to the hearsay rule); 2 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 288, at 256-57 (discussing Palmer and the trustworthiness of business
records).
194. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
195. 497 U.S. 805 (1990); see Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay:
Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause, 81 VA. L.
REV. 149, 166 (1995) (arguing that “[t]he specific component of evidence must be examined for
its internal competence and credibility” because the Constitution does not allow the admittance
of evidence that is incompetent and incredible by itself just because it would allow a conviction
if considered in light of the rest of the evidence); Evidence Law, supra note 183, at 809 (dis-
cussing Wright’s proposition that it is unconstitutional to admit evidence that “is incompetent
and incredible by its own rights” just because in totality it may lead to a conviction); see also su-
pra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing Wright).
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sion under the Confrontation Clause must be drawn from the “total-
ity of circumstances that surround the making of the statement.”196
The Court, however, restricted the analysis to only those circum-
stances surrounding the making of the statement itself.197 Further-
more, the Court held that “[t]o be admissible under the Confronta-
tion Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must
possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness,
not by reference to other evidence at trial.”198 Thus, using corrobo-
rating evidence to establish trustworthiness is probably unconstitu-
tional.
As evidenced in this discussion, section 1370 is poorly drafted
and probably unconstitutional. Ironically, the very statements that the
statute was designed to encompass, the statements of Nicole Brown
Simpson, would likely still be inadmissible under the new exception.199
Perhaps for this reason, section 1370 was not used in the Simpson civil
trial, even though it was enacted to be available for such use.200
IV. A NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION
As discussed previously, the arguments for the creation of a new
hearsay exception are compelling. Furthermore, the barriers to im-
plementing such an exception, while significant, are not insurmount-
able. The requisite necessity basis exists for the creation of such an
exception, but some form of trustworthiness guarantees would have
to be satisfied.
196. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820.
197. See id. at 819.
198. Id. at 822.
199. Diary entries made by Nicole Brown Simpson would not have fallen within the five-
year window required by section 1370(a)(2). Statements made to family and friends soon before
her murder would likely have failed to meet the requirements of section 1370(a)(1)—narrating,
describing, or explaining the infliction or threat of injury—or of section 1370(a)(5), because the
statements were not recorded in writing, recorded electronically, or made to a law enforcement
officer. Additionally, a call to a battered women’s shelter may not have been admissible because
it was not known whether the statement was made near the time of the infliction or threat of
injury, as required by section 1370(a)(3). See Murphy, supra note 169, at 523-25.
200. The first citation to section 1370 at the appellate level (as reflected in a search of Lexis
and Westlaw databases) was in the reversal of O.J. Simpson’s grant of guardianship by the trial
judge. See Simpson v. Brown, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 1998). The appellate judge held
that the trial judge had erred in excluding Nicole Brown Simpson’s diaries from the evidence at
the guardianship hearing. See id. at 404 (stating that one of the clearest justifications for apply-
ing section 1370 is that it “was enacted specifically in response to the fact that these very diaries
could not come into evidence in the criminal trial!”). But see Murphy, supra note 169, at 523-25
(arguing that the diaries would still be inadmissible under section 1370).
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Thus, a new exception would be both appropriate and feasible.201
Two questions remain: which situations warrant a new a hearsay ex-
ception, and what would be the required elements of a new excep-
tion?
A. What Situations Warrant an Exception?
The need to use hearsay statements in domestic abuse cases is
the same whether the victim has died or is “voluntarily” unavail-
able.202 It would, therefore, seem appropriate that a new hearsay ex-
ception be applicable to both situations. Because of some of the in-
herent differences in the types of evidence available in homicide and
nonhomicide situations,203 a different treatment may be warranted.
However, similar statements may be made in each of these situa-
tions—for example, statements made prior to the incident, either re-
counting a past action of domestic violence or a threat of future vio-
lence. The admissibility requirements in these situations would be
correspondingly similar. Thus, an exception based on when the
statement was made would be more useful than one based on
whether the incident was a homicide or nonhomicide. Given the
similarity between the two situations, a single exception would be
preferable to two separate exceptions for homicide and nonhomicide
situations.
B. What Would Be the Required Elements of an Exception?
First, as indicated, the exception should account for both homi-
cide and nonhomicide situations. This is especially necessary if pre-
vention of recurring domestic violence and protection of the victim
are goals of the criminal justice process in this context.
201. Many states currently have a residual hearsay exception. See supra notes 62-63 and ac-
companying text. In these states, a new hearsay exception designed specifically for domestic
violence situations may not be necessary. However, the creation of an exception in these states
would still be appropriate because it would provide a more specific tool for prosecutors, as well
as emphasize that combating domestic violence is a priority for that jurisdiction.
202. See supra Part I.
203. For example, a homicide victim will rarely have the opportunity to make a statement
concerning the events that led to the homicide. If such a statement is available, it may qualify as
a dying declaration and may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. See supra note
29. Otherwise, hearsay statements might include accounts of past actions of domestic violence
or threats of future violence. The nonhomicide victim will usually have had the opportunity to
make a statement concerning the events of the particular assault at issue in the case.
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Second, it should be made clear that the exception applies to the
domestic violence context. While the new California exception,204
passed in the wake of the O.J. Simpson case, was intended to apply to
domestic abuse cases,205 it does not distinguish between domestic vio-
lence and other types of violence. In order to focus the exception on
the domestic violence context, the exception should be explicitly re-
stricted to statements by a current (at the time of the statement) or
former spouse or domestic partner.206
Third, the exception should, like the California exception, be re-
stricted to statements that describe the infliction of a past injury or a
threat of future injury upon the declarant207—statements of belief,
standing alone, should not be admissible. While a statement of belief
(e.g., “I think he’s going to kill me”) may certainly indicate the critical
state of a relationship, it does not provide the context for the belief.
Rather, providing the facts underlying the belief (e.g., “he attacked
before” or “he threatened me”) gives the statement more reliability
and ultimately makes the statement more probative and less prejudi-
cial.
Fourth, the statement should be buttressed by additional trust-
worthiness guarantees. As required by the California exception, the
statement should have been made at or near the time of the infliction
or of the threat of injury208—when the matter was fresh in the wit-
ness’s memory.209 The firsthand knowledge of the declarant must be
clearly shown, as required for any in-court testimony.210 A borderline
state of excitement may also be a factor supporting the trustworthi-
ness of the statement.
Fifth, the statement should also be recorded on videotape.211 Not
only can a videotape provide an accurate record of the words of the
204. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370. For an extended discussion of this section, see supra Part
III.C.
205. See Murphy, supra note 169, at 497-98 (noting that section 1370 was passed in response
to the finding of not guilty in the O.J. Simpson case).
206. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 85, at 161-62 (proposing a hearsay exception with the
requirement that “[t]he declarant . . . was the spouse or domestic partner or former spouse or
domestic partner of the person against whom the statement is offered”).
207. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
208. See id. § 1370(a)(3).
209. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee’s note (“The guarantee of trustworthi-
ness is found in the reliability inherent in a record made while events were still fresh in mind
and accurately reflecting them.”).
210. See id. 602.
211. A statement recorded in writing or on audiotape may help in proving the accuracy of a
statement, but it cannot be considered a proxy for appearance, and it is subject to concerns of
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victim, but a statement recorded on videotape can also act as a surro-
gate for personal presence at trial. The opportunity for a jury to be
able to view the demeanor and physical appearance of the victim, as
well as to detect any potential coercion, can significantly enhance the
trustworthiness of the statement.212 At the very least, this would allow
the jury to determine for itself the trustworthiness of the statement.
Such videotapes should not be staged at a later time, however, as for
a deposition. Rather, the admissible videotape should be made at the
initial interview with the police or other official, in which the de-
meanor and physical appearance would provide an extra degree of
trustworthiness. Furthermore, the potential impact of such a video-
tape—for example, if the victim appears disheveled (perhaps showing
signs of physical violence), appears frightened, or is visibly recovering
from a traumatic experience—could also play an extremely significant
role.213
Finally, there should be a notice requirement so as to provide the
defendant with a fair opportunity to respond to the statement.214
While this notice would preferably occur before trial, the nature of a
victim’s testimony—i.e., that the victim may surprise the prosecution
by recanting on the witness stand—allows notice to occur during trial.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is a serious problem in today’s society. The
ability of prosecutors to bring domestic abusers effectively to justice is
made difficult by several factors: domestic violence incidents occur in
private, the victim is often unavailable or unwilling to testify, and
statements of the victim are barred by the hearsay rule. Although
some jurisdictions avoid this problem by expanding existing hearsay
exceptions to admit hearsay statements of the victim, a more appro-
lack of formality and potential coercion. See supra note 101.
212. Cf. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L.
REV. 387, 487-88 (1996) (discussing the merits of videotaped interrogations in place of following
the Miranda procedures).
213. The use of videotape when interviewing domestic violence victims may not always be
practical, as such equipment may not always be available for use. See, e.g., State v. Villarreal,
889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995) (discussing the practicality of videotaping confessions). However,
video recording equipment is becoming more readily available and more practical outside of the
police station. See Heath S. Berger, Comment, Let’s Go to the Videotape: A Proposal to Legis-
late Videotaping of Confessions, 3 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 165, 178 (1993) (identifying the limita-
tions of videotaping confessions outside the police station, but noting that advancing technology
makes such videotaping more feasible).
214. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 807 (requiring that the proponent make his intent to use a
statement known to an adverse party “sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing”).
HUDDERS TO PRINTER 06/22/00 2:54 PM
2000] HEARSAY IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 1075
priate solution would be to create a new exception specific to the do-
mestic violence context. Such an exception is warranted by the need
to use the hearsay statements at trial and to advance a policy of re-
ducing domestic violence through the effective prosecution of domes-
tic abusers. A new exception would have to have certain guarantees
of trustworthiness to pass Confrontation Clause muster, but, through
the use of videotape and other requirements, these guarantees can be
provided.
